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1. Introduction
Uganda is one of only a handful of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which have taken part
in the new wave of decentralization. The process differs from the efforts of the 1960s and
1970s in that this time governments seem ready to cede real power to the lower (local
government) levels. It also takes place alongside broad economic and political reforms and
with the support of the donor community that is convinced that aid is most beneficial in
countries where recipients are able to participate in the political process that determines its
use.
However, like was the case in the 1960s, it is sometimes easy to romanticize about the
benefits of decentralization, and thus fail to take into account the detailed work required
before it benefits people at the local level. In many African countries, an important
impediment to decentralization has been lack of financial and human resources. These two
deficiencies work interactively. Local governments find it difficult to raise enough revenue
and therefore are unable to hire able administrators and other officials to manage
programmes. To ensure the provision of essential services, local leaders often have no
alternative but to fall back on funds from the centre. The combination of lack of
managerial resources, inadequate finances and poor access to markets implies that the
concept of independence at the local level is illusory, with the centre dictating the
development agenda and local bureaucrats continuing to be beholden to the line ministries.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact of decentralization on the local
governments’ capacity to undertake development activities in Uganda and, in particular, to
evaluate how the new policies have affected the provision of services at the local level.
After a brief theoretical appraisal, the chapter discusses key aspects of the reform of local
administration in Uganda, implemented by Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance
Movement (NRM) during the past 15 years. We investigate what impact the reforms have
had on local bureaucracies, and especially how local populations have been mobilized for
development programmes and the extent to which they have participate in policy decisions.
We then look at some of the problems encountered in the course of implementing
decentralization.
2. Issues in rural institutional reform and decentralization
Interest group politics suggest that politicians at the centre have little wish to cede their
vast powers, notably those over public finances, to the local level. That they only embark
on meaningful rural reforms, including decentralization, when they detect real benefits to
themselves and their political supporters from incorporating the countryside into the
mainstream political process. For example, when this gives them a political advantage over
their competitors at the centre or when to generate welfare enhancing growth, create
broader markets for urban based industries or support the agricultural activities of the elite,
it becomes necessary to liberalize the economy as well as domestic politics.
In earlier efforts at rural mobilization and social engineering, past African leaders had
embarked on measures collectively referred to as ‘African Socialism’, these were
exemplified by Nyerere’s Ujamaa, and on a milder scale by Kaunda’s Humanism and2
Obote’s Common Man’s Charter. As detailed in studies by Kasfir (1976) and Hydén
(1980) these radical political postures bore little fruit. Kasfir notes that paradoxically all
these efforts at incorporating rural dwellers and the poor into the political process during
the first decade of independence in the 1960s, seemed to serve the opposite purpose of
alienating them further. Thus the politics of national unity that had preceded independence
had broken down into ethnic groupings, leading to a ‘shrinking’ political arena. Hydén
argues, on his part, that though seeming to be the direct and indirect objects of political
attention of the post-independence leaders, peasants remained decidedly ‘uncaptured’. This
was partly because there was preciously little attempt to translate the ambitious
development agendas of the 1960s and 1970s into practical measures to develop the
countryside and raise rural welfare. At one extreme, the controls introduced in a bid to
improve resource husbandry had broken down into a crude exploitation of the countryside
via commodity marketing boards and import substitution schemes undertaken with the help
of foreign exchange controls (Bunker, 1987).
What then has changed in recent years to justify the current optimism regarding the
developmental impact of decentralization? Three factors can be named in this regard. First,
decentralization, at least in theory, is said to hold great potential for development (see for
example Collins and Green, 1994). It can be said to possess a dual mandate. Decentralized
government provides space for people to participate in the formulation of policies that
affect them directly, including the setting of local taxes, provision of social services and
ensuring security of life and property. It is also assumed that it is easier to exercise
inclusive politics, which enable communities and groups to influence policies that affect
their daily lives, at the local than at the national level. Indeed for many aid agencies local
participation has become the focus of their aid programmes (see for example British
Government, 1997). In recent years, this has led to the strengthening of ‘civil society’ as a
counterweight to the powers of the central government. The most visible exponent of this
trend has been the growth of the non-governmental sector (NGOs) in many African
countries to the extent that worries have been expressed over the negative impact that the
bypassing of the state might have on public sector effectiveness.
Besides decentralization is assumed to improve decision making at the local level and to
raise the quality of governance. Also, by encouraging local participation, decentralization
enhances resource mobilization, including development aid, and ensures a more efficient
use of resources. This raises the production of goods and services and thus local welfare
(Bossuyt and Gould, 2000).
Second, the process of decentralization in Sub-Saharan African has coincided with, and
perhaps even been dictated by, efforts by the donor community to reorient aid policies.
Today, countries that emphasize broader political participation and that show a high degree
of ownership of domestic reforms, including a focus on poverty reduction are apt to get
more support (see for example British Government, 1997). Since populations in Sub-
Saharan Africa will remain predominantly rural for the foreseeable future, rural-based
policies, emphasizing decentralization of power as well as local participation will continue
to attract aid resources (MacLure, 1995).
Third, the structural adjustment policies pursued in the various African countries have
changed the urban-rural terms of trade, especially in countries with a traditional cash crop
sector. In many countries one now finds urban groups that are in many ways worse off
compared to their rural counterparts (Jamal and Weeks, 1993; Kiggundu, 1997). The3
removal of commodity marketing boards and other marketing monopolies has increased
the incomes of farmers in some countries and thus raised their bargaining power vis-à-vis
the centre. This is certainly true for parts of Uganda and Ghana.
However, while proximity to political leaders and influencing policy at the local level is
thought to be important, it is naive to think that power structures at the local level are
radically different from those at the centre. Among rural power structures, the relatively
well-off still dominate the top, while, as a rule, at most levels men hold the reins of power.
Thus, even at the local level, the most disadvantaged members of the community including
women, the aged, the handicapped and children have poor access to policymakers and,
thus, exert little real influence on policy (Obbo, 1988; Guwatudde, 1997).
Recent reforms, especially those focusing on poverty eradication, have sought to
incorporate all social groups in the development process. In fact, the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) meant to be the basis for poverty reduction in individual countries
are partly based on a participatory process of interviews, meetings and other interaction
with all segments of society. However, the politics of inclusion have been complicated by
the sheer number of interventions undertaken so far as well as the number of groups
engaged in the exercise.
3. Local government in Uganda: a short history
Throughout Uganda’s colonial history, the issue of how to govern the various districts of
the country was a source of constant debate. During the earlier part of the twentieth
century, a policy of governance, known as ‘indirect rule’, which had been tried with some
success in Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi and Tanganyika, was introduced in Uganda in areas
which had kings or established chiefs (Golola, 1977). In the rest of the country, a more
direct form of local administration was used (Low and Pratt, 1960). It can also be argued,
however, that while indirect rule enabled Britain to conserve its financial and human
resources, it meant that the form of local administration that was adopted in Uganda was
fairly unimaginative. The Buganda Kingdom, which evolved its own system of local
government well before colonization, comprised the administrative centre of the colony. Its
privileged position at the centre, with encouragement from the new rulers, helped it to
export its institutions, notably the hierarchical power structures, to the rest of the country,
in the process enjoying a form of suzerainty over major parts of the country.
On Uganda’s attainment of independence in 1962, some powers were devolved to the
kingdoms. However, the post-independence constitution was short-lived and was abrogated
in April 1966 following the overthrow of the titular head of state. A new (and republican)
constitution was promulgated in 1967. Under it, a new Local Administration Act (1967)
was enacted with provisions that totally ignored the relevance of local government
councils, instead transferring and concentrating most of their earlier powers into central
government. For example, not only were local government budgets subject to approval
from the minister of local government, local by-laws were subordinated to the ministry of
local government, which also had the power to revoke them. In terms of financing, ultimate
accountability was to the minister of local government and not directly to the local people.
Finally, the minister of local government had the power to terminate the mandate of the
local councillors and to dissolve local government councils as well.4
These features greatly constrained the independence of local governments and reduced
their flexibility and ability to renovate. Ultimately, local government councils had very
little powers over their employees, with local employment creation sometimes used by
politicians at the centre as an avenue for exercising political patronage. In fact, according
to the 1967 Local Administration Act, even the lowest ranking employees in local
government were appointed by the President (Nsibambi, 1998).
The situation was further radicalized when Milton Obote introduced his ‘Move to the Left’,
which envisioned a socialist future for Uganda, where the ‘common man’ had ultimate
authority in the running of the country. In his Communication from the Chair, delivered at
the beginning of the 1970s, Obote (1970: 8) declared that ‘from now on there would be one
Public Service embracing all public officers in the Government’. Further the President saw
no reason why public officers received allowances for working outside their duty stations,
since this gave the impression that some parts of the country were more desirable to work
in than others. Such allowances were thus abolished.
However, the new reforms were surpassed by Idi Amin’s coup d’etat of early 1971. The
stature of local governments probably reached its lowest point during Amin’s tenure in the
1970s. He abandoned his initial attempts at incorporating civilians into his cabinet,
bringing in soldiers instead. These had little interest in public affairs. In attempts at
removing potential competitors from the barracks, he had also established provincial
administrations, along with provincial governors, most of them fellow soldiers. However,
this fitted poorly into the overall administrative structure of the country. The military
governors had few real tasks, and were known to undertake such mundane tasks as
personally arresting smugglers at the borders or, in the case of the Kampala Governor,
arresting banana sellers who had ‘inflated’ their prices (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa,
1999).
When Milton Obote assumed power in Uganda for a second time 1980 (referred to as
Obote II), he was initially very successful in returning the economy to stability, partly
thanks to assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. Policy statements at the time even
suggest that changes in the country’s administration were being planned. However,
Museveni’s guerrilla insurgence embarked on in the early 1980s reversed this and Obote II
increasingly diverted resources to the military. There was very little focus on local
government reforms at this time. This was roughly the state of affairs when the National
Resistance Movement under Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) captured
power at the beginning of 1986. On attaining power, the NRM initiated the process of
empowering local government through decentralization. It marked the most far-reaching
measures to decentralize administration that has ever been attempted in the country
(Langseth and Mugaju, 1996).
4. Innovations of the local council system
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement saw decentralization and the devolution of
power as key means of introducing popular democracy and fostering local governance. It
would promote capacity building at the local level and ensure that there are local inputs in
the decision making process, especially with respect to service delivery. These factors
would in turn help foster a local sense of ownership of development programmes.5
The decentralization and local government reforms started with a commission of inquiry
headed by a Makerere University academic Mahmood Mamdani (Republic of Uganda,
1997). Following the Commission’s Report, the first step towards reviving the local
government powers and functions was the enactment of the 1987 Resistance
Council/Committees (RCs) Statute No. 9, which legalised the resistance councils and gave
them powers of jurisdiction at the local level.1
The decentralization policy in Uganda is based on a hierarchy of councils and committees
including the village (LCI), parish (LC II), subcounty (LC II), county (LC IV) and district
level (LC V). Each level is headed by a chairperson, while district levels council meetings
are chaired by speakers.2 The local councils have a number of committees including those
on finance, education, works and transport, security and gender. These political structures
were legalised by the 1993 Resistance Council Statute, which was in turn enshrined in the
Uganda Constitution of 1995, with amendments made the Local Government Act, 1997
(Makerere Institute for Social Research, 2000: 2). The main objectives of decentralization
were the following (Government of Uganda, 1997: 9)
· To transfer real power to the districts and thereby reduce the workload on remote and
under-resourced government officials at the centre.
· To bring political and administrative control over services to the point where they are
actually delivered.
· To improve financial accountability and responsibility by establishing a clear link
between payment of taxes and provision of services.
· To improve the capacity of local councils to plan, finance and manage the delivery of
services to their constituents.
What impact have these far-reaching interventions had on the local government’s ability to
deliver services and to what extent have local populations been involved in the running of
their affairs? We have assembled the main goals of the decentralization process in Uganda
along with policy innovations intended to achieve results in Table 1.
Five goals have been identified. The first is to involve local populations in the decision and
problem resolving process, thereby empowering them. The second relates to
democratization of the decision making process. The third is to enhance the mobilization of
resources at the local level. Fourth, to reduce costs for service delivery. Fifth, to raise
efficiency and accountability at the local level. To what extent have these innovations led
to the results expected and what have been the actual outcomes? We shall discuss the
extent to which these goals have been achieved in turn.
1 ‘Resistance councils’ were carryovers from Museveni’s guerrilla war. They were converted to ‘local
councils’ since, after achieving power, there was nothing to resist any longer. Note, however, that the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) has retained its name.
2 At lower levels, the chairperson calls and chairs the meeting. Hence the frequent charges of dictatorship at
these levels.6
Table 1
Decentralization in Uganda: goals, policy innovations and outcomes
Goals Policy innovations Comments on outcomes
1. Incorporate local
people in the
management of their own
affairs.
Identify local problems and find
solutions to be implemented by
locally elected organs.
Raising the local people’s
interest in the management
of their affairs is probably
the strongest outcome of the
decentralization effort in
Uganda.
2. Democratization of the
decision making process.
Elect local leaders instead of having
them appointed by central
government
Local level democracy is
taking longer to take hold,
probably for lack of
precedent. Many
chairpersons are said to be
‘dictatorships’ who are
difficult to remove.
3. Mobilization of local
resources.
Make budgets and prioritise
expenditure according to needs at
the local level.
Few local governments are
financially independent from
the centre and continue to
be beholden to government.
4. Reduce costs for
service delivery.
Improve social infrastructure and
expand social service provision in
the countryside.
Scarcity of resources makes
the undertaking of extensive
infrastructure and social
service extensions difficult.
5. Raise efficiency and
accountability at the local
level.
Enhance human resources by
appointing professional staff to run
local services.
The quality of staff
recruitment at the local level
is improving, though lack of
resources implies that many
positions are not filled.
Source: from author’s notes.
Empowerment
The empowerment of local populations by involving them in the identification and the
finding of solutions to their problems has been the driving feature of decentralization in
Uganda. As already noted, local councils are composed of elected local people, who often
hold personal stakes in the welfare of the area. Such individuals are expected to have
considerable interest in the deliberations of the councils and to defend the interests of their
constituencies versus, for example, the demands of the central government.7
In a study of the evolution of decentralization in Uganda and its impact on rural
communities Brett (1993) notes a number of admirable outcomes. He argues that in
ethnically divided countries like Uganda, peace and development crucially depend on the
presence of effective local authority structures. Since Ugandan authorities have been
persistent in their devolution efforts, Brett sees the possibility of getting the diverse groups
in the country to start feeling that ‘they are getting a fair deal’ in terms of access to
resources. Furthermore, the new decentralization system, by involving hundreds of
thousands of people, hitherto totally ignored, into the political process at the local level has
stimulated a rapid growth in social responsibility and political creativity. The local council
system has also increased the involvement of women in local politics. Women are reserved
a certain number of seats on the councils, while a gender committee focuses on their
special interests. However, analysts feel that impediments to women development in
Uganda, especially in matters related to property ownership, remain formidable
(Guwatudde, 1997).
Democratization of decision making
Through local councils and committees, the powers and responsibilities for making
decisions over issues of local concern in the district have been democratized. This
represents a fundamental shift from the traditional procedure where policies implemented
at the local government level were made by state bureaucrats based in the capital city, and
thus far away from the people affected by those decisions. Similarly, it has been argued
(Lubanga, 1996: 56; Kullenberg and Porter, 1999: 12; Kisakye, 1996) that compared to
earlier systems, the LC system has proven superior in helping communities reach
consensus on political and development issues. This is because the new system moves
away from the unbridled and comprehensive subordination of local to centre of the past to
a relationship steeped in consensus building, participation in policy formulation and
negotiation. Increased transparency in local government has improved the stakeholders’
capacity to expose the practices of malfeasance and corruption, which in the past often
went undetected at the central level, and to initiate corrective action (Kwagala 1998: 113).
Mobilization of local resources
Following the old adage ‘no taxation without representation’, policymakers believed that
the system of local councils, where elected representatives took part, would improve the
mobilization of local resources, including taxation. Proximity to local policymakers would
increase tax compliance, as the population would not only be able to see the direct benefits,
in terms of improved services, but would also be able to monitor the use of resources and
via the local councils hold errant officials accountable for abuse of office. The Local
Government Act of 1997 allows district and subdistrict councils to collect and expend
revenue from certain sources, such as market dues and graduated tax. However, the tax
base in Uganda differs markedly between districts and regions. Thus while local inputs
have made an important contribution to local government activities in some parts of the
country in others there has been a more than disproportionate dependency on central
government funding.
Improvement of service delivery
Resource mobilization is closely related to the local government’s capacity to improve
service delivery. In the past few years, local councils have assumed a number of functions,
which were previously performed by line ministries. These include political administration,
judicial services involving minor cases, monitoring and supervision of development8
projects at the local level and maintenance of community roads. However, not all local
governments have the financial or human resources required to provide an adequate level
of services. At the lowest levels, much of the work done by councillors is voluntary. Some
local council members even complain about ‘poor facilitation’ and the fact that they have
to abandon their income generating activities to attend to council work without
compensation. Such people might be difficult to hold accountable to the local
communities.
Efficiency and accountability
To what extent has accountability and transparency in local government been enhanced by
the decentralization measures? Lack of transparency, and indeed corruption, are among the
spurs for faster decentralization. However, part of the reasons why corruption and abuse of
office were so rampant at the centre was because of poor managerial capacities. Thus it has
been argued by some that care should be taken lest rapid decentralization leads to
decentralized corruption. This would be especially true where local administration
capacities are weaker than at the centre.
According to Lubanga (1998), however, the government has undertaken important changes
that might assist in curbing corruption at the local government level. First, central
government allocations to local governments (intergovernmental transfers) are governed by
objective criteria. These funds are currently divided into ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’
grants. Conditional grants are disbursed when the local governments fulfil the agreements
with the government regarding certain targets, such as recruiting teachers, purchase of
drugs or provision of extension services. These grants cover recurrent expenditure while
unconditional grants cover local capital expenditures. The government plans to eventually
decentralize the development budget to the districts. Second, funds for local government
operations are no longer routed through line ministries. Instead, the Minister of Finance
remits funds directly to the accounting officer of each district. An innovation is that the
amounts disbursed are published in local newspapers. This enables the local populations to
know what to expect in terms of service provision and acts as a deterrent to financial abuse.
Furthermore ‘ghost’ employees at local levels have been spotted and eliminated.
In a paper on the experience of Rakai District in southern Uganda, Semakula (1997) is
categorical that the institution of local government councils and committees with full
authority over their areas of jurisdiction has resulted in improved efficiency, accountability
and transparency in the execution of local government business. He argues that the fact that
all public servants in the district and lower tiers are all accountable to the local population,
via the local councils, has been a crucial determining factor.
It ought to be remarked that before decentralization most local governments began
spending money before their budgets were approved. Since their expenditures were thus
technically unauthorized, no budget performance evaluation was ever undertaken.
However, since the start of financial decentralization, all councils have been required to
have their budgets approved by the appropriate committees, as a first step towards making
the budget management process transparent. This also makes it possible to use the budget
as a management tool. Furthermore, local budgets enable the centre to ‘monitor and
evaluate the budgetary and financial management performance of local governments’
(Lubanga 1998: 93). In addition, better streamlined budgets have made it possible for
authorities to undertake frequent audits of financial statements. This reduces financial9
abuse and leads to the apprehension of culprits. This is a vast improvement on the earlier
system, when it took the public accounts committee of the parliament years to examine the
books of accounts of the district administrations, if at all.
Closely related to efficiency and accountability, is the skill level of the local bureaucrats.
Although, the Local Government Act of 1977 provides district councils powers to recruit
their own staff members as they see fit, funds for recruiting and motivating educated
personnel have been scarce in most local governments. Thus while the more affluent
districts, closer to the capital, have been able to lay off incompetent or unqualified
individuals inherited from the central government and replace them with more competent
ones, poorer districts have seen little change. Thus, on the whole, it has not been easy to
improve administrative structures by hiring new individuals, and implementation capacities
remain low in many districts. At the district level, service committees have been set up to
handle issues related to employment within local governments, with powers to hire,
discipline and dismiss employees. This streamlining of the local governments’ employment
process has helped reduce instances of irregular appointments. On the whole, the
recruitment of personnel has been easier in the richer districts, to the south of the country
than the poorer ones to the north, where lack of opportunities for generating extra incomes
has made it difficult to attract competent staff.
However, there is little agreement on what qualifications the districts’ political leaders, as
opposed to their employees, should have. Remembering the brutalities unleashed by
Amin’s ‘uneducated horde’ in the 1970s, there have been demands that leaders at all levels
should be highly qualified. While such demands are feasible in urban areas, notably for the
parliament, they become less realiztic the further from the capital the district lies.
5. Constraints on local governance
Having reviewed key features of the decentralization and the devolution of power in
Uganda, we shall now look at some of the constraints faced by local administrations in
realizing the promise of administrative autonomy (refer also to comments on outcomes in
Table 1). The constraints and challenges to decentralization can be presented in three broad
categories. First, are the difficulties paused by a general lack of financial and human
resources, which have hindered policy innovation and limited the independence of local
governments. Second, are the complex centre-local relations, whereby political
confrontations at the centre, at least their results, have tended to flow over to the districts
and further below, thereby altering policy parameters at the local level. The third aspect to
take into consideration relates to the political and economic dynamics at the local level
itself. Instead of enhancing unity in supposedly homogeneous entities, political autonomy
has in some districts tended to unleash clashes of personalities and aspirations. Has
decentralization led to fractionalization instead of the reverse?
Lack of resources leads to programme failure and reduced independence
Lack of own resources is probably the single most important impediment to local
governance in Uganda. It has severely limited the extent to which local leaders can deliver
on their electoral promises, notably improvement of social services, and limits their ability
to resist demands and interference from politicians at the centre as well as those from line
ministries. With their independence thus curtailed and lacking own funds, local10
governments run the risk of becoming instruments for the propagation of political schemes
or for the exercise of patronage by politicians at the centre.
Lack of resources also limits the extent to which local leaders can motivate their staff and
retain them in the now stiff competition between the public and private sector for educated
and efficient employees. Traditionally the wage levels in local government were very low
compared to those of the centre, especially since local governments very seldom employed
graduates from universities. It has been necessary over the past few years to adjust wage
levels upwards, though given the resource constraints named above not many graduates
have been absorbed into the local administrations. This might not have been serious if local
governments had embarked on retraining programmes to upgrade the skills of their labour
force. This again has been impossible owing to serious lack of resources. A shortage of
skilled staff has thus put a limit on the amount of intervention that local governments can
embark on successfully. It also implies that important aspects of accountability, for
example keeping the books in order, refining policies or designing new ones, cannot be
undertaken easily. It could be argued, however, that this shortage of skilled personnel is
only transient, being caused mainly by the low levels of salaries. Given that Uganda’s
educated labour force has expanded substantially in the past two decades, the problem of
shortage of skills might be resolved when local governments design more attractive terms
of service, including improved remuneration.
Thirdly, lack of resources causes a serious shortage of supplies, equipment and physical
structures, making daily operations difficult and the realization of policy targets all but
impossible. Although lack of basic facilities and tools is partly a result of serious under
capitalization in past decades, areas of the country that have experienced long periods of
political strife in the 1970s and 1980s have seen their social infrastructure, including
schools and clinics destroyed, making their situation even more precarious today. In these
areas employees have had to improvize in a multitude of ways to be able to perform their
duties. Children are still taught under trees in some areas, while local government offices
are often derelict structures, poorly protected from the elements.
Centre-local relations remain complex
As argued above, the central government’s wish to control the periphery made a nuisance
of many earlier attempts to cede powers to local authorities. Direct coercion, including
legislation, was often necessary to restrain the clamour for autonomy at the district level
(Roberts, 1982). To what extent then has the new approach to decentralization, based on
local councils, reduced the tension between the centre and the districts in matters of policy
co-ordination, budgeting and accountability?
Critics of the decentralization process in Uganda have argued that the policy was
introduced too hurriedly, with little preparation of stakeholders, notably the local
populations. At the technical level, the legislation required to formalize many of the
changes came after the fact. This left considerable room for discretion to politicians. Also
owing to the speedy implementation of decentralization, there developed between 1986
and 1989 some confusion over who determined policies at the local level, whether it was
the newly created resistance council (later renamed local council) officials or government
appointed ‘chiefs’ from earlier years. While resistance council leaders had taken over the
formal duties of the chiefs in the regular local administrations, the traditional organs of the
state, such as the police and magistrates, were not giving the resistance council leadership11
the recognition and support required to establish effective administration (Makara, 1998:
35).
This policy opaqueness at the local level made it difficult for the rural population to
internalize the new system. Since the new system’s credibility depended to a large extent
on the local people’s reaction to its provisions and their ability to sanction poor
performance, it was imperative that they understood the issues involved (Semakula, 1996).
The Local Government Statute of 1993, was the central government’s attempt to remove
the confusion of roles at the local level. It presented a decentralized structure of
government with sufficient powers for councillors at local levels to make decisions
designed to encourage development projects in their localities. The statute was the
precursor to the Local Governments Act of 1997.
However, advocates of gradualism have also been opposed (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1993;
Byarugaba, 1997). The argument is that decentralization implies a system shift and as such
will threaten various interest groups including politicians. Indeed whenever there are
changes in the political system, there is bound to be resistance and sometimes apathy.
These reactions do not mean that change promises little benefit to the population. Since it
introduces new ideas and policies and alters the way things are done, change might be the
key contribution of decentralization to development.
But perhaps the most important source of conflict between centre and local administration
relates to money. Decentralization would have had little content if the central budget had
not been similarly decentralized. Thus the goal of financial decentralization was to assign
responsibilities and taxes between the centre and local governments, as well as to enable
the transfer of grants and other resources from the centre. First, a block grant was devised
whereby the central government allocated funds to the districts based on the number and
quality of programmes of the line ministries in each district. This was, however, seriously
flawed, seeming to favour areas, which already had good access to public resources. It was
replaced by an allocation system based on a ‘needs-based formula’ with a weighting of 10
percent for area of district, 10 percent for the size of the general population, 40 percent for
that of the school-going population and 40 percent for child mortality. Still, since the
weighting scheme does not take into account the capacity of regions to collect taxes, a
degree of inequality in resource distribution remained.
Beginning in the 1993/94 financial year, there was a phased financial decentralization,
which began with 13 districts, with another 14 districts decentralized in the 1994/95
financial year. The process was completed in the 1995/96 financial year when the
remaining 35 districts also entered the process. Besides block grants, two other grants are
the conditional grant and the equalization grant. Conditional grants, as the name suggests,
were to be based on certain conditions, to encourage districts to undertake projects in areas
such as poverty reduction, which would have been ignored otherwise. However, the
conditions have been difficult to define and these types of grants have been given to
districts, but without the accompanying conditions, thus becoming a form of block grants.
The equalization grant is to be based on assessment of resource endowments, with poorer
districts compensated accordingly.
However, for the system of transfers to succeed in achieving the goals envisaged by the
centre and the local government, there is need for a high degree of accountability. This has
been very difficult to establish in most districts. Local councils have failed to deliver12
monthly accounts of expenditure for purposes of planning and budgeting to the centre, as
for example requested by the ministry of finance. In trying to reconcile the budgetary
process at the centre, the ministry of finance has thus resorted to threats, including
withdraw of funding from the districts not complying with its directives and to publish the
list of districts not doing so in the local newspapers. On the other hand, while the financial
decentralization exercise was intended to reduce total expenditure and personnel in the line
ministries, local governments complain that this has not been the case. Departments in line
ministries were also supposed with decentralization to reduce their functions to those of
policymaking and supervision, relegating operations and related expenditures to the district
level. This has not happened to the extent expected. The bulk of government expenditure is
still undertaken at the centre (Decentralization Secretariat, 1998).
Centre politics often spill over
Decentralization was also meant to insulate local governments from the political whims of
the centre. However, politics at the centre tends to spillover to districts in a variety of ways.
Here we shall illustrate with three cases: the sudden abolishment of poll tax during the
general elections of 2001, the issue of land reform and the maintenance of local security.
During the presidential campaigns of 2001, President Museveni announced the abolition of
‘graduated tax’. In spite of its name, this tax is in reality a poll tax imposed on all adult
males, irrespective of their employment status. It is unpopular not only because it is not
means based, but also because its collection, especially at the lower levels, involves
considerable coercion, including the deployment of armed guards at times.3 It also happens
to be an important source of income in the districts, as the funds collected are retained at
the district headquarters. In some districts, graduated tax accounts for up to 40 percent of
local government revenue. The sudden abolition of the tax, seemingly without prior
consultation, led to serious loss of revenue in the districts. The lack of consultations with
the local authorities, which are very dependent on it, illustrates the fragility of their powers
in the face of political competition at the centre. Subsequently, local governments have
petitioned the central government for a ‘special stabilization grant’ to compensate them for
the revenue loss. Since the government has not responded adequately, many local
authorities have decided to scale down on their operations, especially the delivery of
services.
The second illustration relates to land. In Uganda, indeed as in other agrarian economies,
land issues are at the centre of economic and political debate. Decentralization has brought
many of these issues into sharp relief in recent years. As part of its vision for Uganda, the
ruling National Resistance Movement has advocated for a far-reaching land reform in
order to ensure a more efficient land use and egalitarian land distribution. In July 1998, a
new land act came into force. It vested the powers to handle land disputes with subcounty
and district land tribunals. In the country as a whole there was to be 45 district land
tribunals and over 700 subcounty tribunals. The system of specialized land tribunals was
introduced when land disputes threatened to swamp lower courts and local councils in long
drawn out disputes, which hampered work in other areas of the local economy. However,
the government did not have sufficient funds to put the tribunals into operation. The high
court then became the only instance, which could handle land disputes in the country. This
3 In some districts, tax collectors raid homes early in the morning before men folk have left. This sometimes
forces defaulters to sleep in the ‘bushes’ until the tax collection campaigns are over.13
effectively grounded all land cases. In light of this, the judicial service commission
recommended that, at least for the time being, the old order, whereby local councils and
lower courts adjudicated land cases, should be restored.
The last example relates to security. The NRM’s proudest boast is that it returned peace to
Uganda. To increase security in communities, the government introduced a system of local
defence units (LDU), with a unit in each locality throughout the country. The unit was
under the control of the local council. Members of the LDU would be from the
communities themselves and selected by community members. The original idea was that
the LDUs were to be maintained by the communities themselves, while the government
provided equipment and training.4 However, although first created in 1986, when
Museveni took power in Kampala, LDUs were at least by early 2001 not yet formalized, by
say a relevant act of Parliament, as an armed force in the country. This illegitimacy has
meant that that the welfare of LDU officers and men is not given anywhere as serious
attention as that of the regular army. Some members of the force have been blamed for
engaging in violence, including robbery. Short of resources, the local councils have also
had an ambivalent relationship with their LDUs. They have not been able to maintain these
forces or to supply them with basic equipment (for example, gumboots and rainproof
overcoats).5 Moreover, the central government has not been willing to cede control over
armed groups to local councils. As a sign of the control still exercised by the centre, the
government recently brought the LDUs back into its fold. In the future they will be seen as
a department of the regular armed forces. This was also probably done because the
government feels the need to keep a close watch on the activities of the LDUs, especially
given the insecurity that currently affects the Great Lakes Region.
The conclusion to draw from the above examples is that the new local institutions and their
bureaucracies are not yet strong enough to resist political pressure from the centre.
Graduated tax is retrogressive and was bound to be eradicated eventually. However, it is a
major source of revenue at the local level and abolishing it without consultation dealt a
serious blow to the planning and budgetary processes at the local level. However, it is clear
that the timing of its abolition was meant to garner votes for the presidential incumbent. In
the case of land issues, as well as local security, the illustrations above show that the
wishes of the centre will continue to influence events at the local level.
Most recently, members of parliament have sought to sit in on the meetings of the local
councils in their constituencies.6 They argue that this will enable them to use their vast
experience at the national level to assist deliberations at the local level. However, there is a
danger that if this is institutionalized, local councils will lose their autonomy, with the
4 In an estimate, the Monitor Newspaper, August 31 1999 put the total LDU force in the country at 3000.
5 A typical LDU funding scheme in the Kampala area could look like this: the Kampala City Council pays
about 15 dollars per month to each LDU soldier, while the fees collected from citizens for communal security
tops this up. But since the volume of fees collected fluctuates considerably, and between districts of the city,
the pay is quite uneven – another reflection of the non-regularised nature of the LDU functions.
6 See for instance the article ‘MPs want ex-officio status in Districts’, New Vision, February 8, 2001. MPs
have, for example, claimed that the district leaders have ‘hijacked Government programmes and given credit
to themselves’. The wishes of the MPs have more or less been conceded, although there have been worries
that MPs would then dictate the agenda, which would be counteracting the decentralization efforts (see also
Prud’homme 1995).14
spillover from national politics being felt much more than before. It is also possible that the
local councils might then become arenas in which the proxy battles for political succession
at the centre will be fought. Thus, given institutional weaknesses in local governments, the
rules of the game will continue to be dictated at the centre. For some time to come, local
authorities will be left to adjust to them as best they can.
Decentralization and fractionalization
To what extent has decentralization led to fractionalization at the local level? Since the
onset of decentralization in the mid 1980s, there has been a tendency in Uganda of splitting
up districts into ever smaller entities in the belief that atomization will create the dynamics
of self-governance and ability to influence decisions that are emphasized by the national
resistance movement.7 However, given the dearth of human and financial resources, this
has also caused considerable confusion. In many instances the newly created districts have
had to start from scratch without buildings or other infrastructure. Normally, they have to
draw staff, with accompanying equipment, from the headquarters of the older district. This
has proven to be quite disruptive and conflict-ridden.8 The ‘breakaway’ district is
sometimes embargoed by the part of the older district, which retains the old headquarters.
There are thus costs to atomization, especially since the splitting up of district seldom
emanates from a clear-cut strategy of maximizing local benefits but is often done in
response to the wishes of important pressure groups and political supporters of the central
government.
Is atomization and homogeneity good or bad? They are certainly not uniformly good. It can
be argued for example that conflicts are managed better in urban areas because urban
dwellers are more heterogeneous by origin but similar in education and other
characteristics, such as consumption and leisure patterns. It is the latter accoutrements
rather than commonality of ancestral origin that dictate the speed at which communities
absorb new ideas, including the benefits of political collaboration.
6. Assessing the impact on production, service provision and welfare
As argued above decentralization has meant policy intervention on a vast scale. However,
while the benefits of decentralization seem to be fairly obvious in theory, in practice there
is no unequivocal method of measuring them with certainty. This is because for lack of
counterfactual history in real life, it is often difficult to say whether the observed change is
a result of policy or of exogenous events. This can be illustrated by the situation of
households in northern Uganda. There the failure for poverty to decline dramatically in
recent years, as has happened in the southern parts of the country, is more to blame on
continued insurgence, which has weakened local capacities, than on the failure of
decentralization itself. Still, as has been illustrated by recent household surveys as well as
7 The scope of the decentralization effort can be given by the fact that there are 45,000 villages, 5,000
parishes, 900 sub-counties and 170 counties (each of the latter being represented by a Member of
Parliament). In elections at the parish level, the process cannot go ahead before 30 percent of the electorate
are assembled.
8 There have also been problems with pensions, with new districts not wishing to assume the pension
liabilities for retired civil servants now belong to their local government.15
participatory poverty assessments (see Republic of Uganda, 1999) give us some idea of the
evolution of production and welfare trends during the era of decentralization in Uganda.
Indicators of the impact of decentralization and local institutional reforms can be divided
into effectiveness indicators, such as those illustrating the extent to which the goals of
reform have been achieved. For example whether proximity to health and education
services in the rural areas has improved or whether agricultural extension services have
become more effective. Other indicators would be whether the rate of infant mortality has
declined and whether rural livestock has better access to water etc. On the other hand,
response indicators, show the speed at which local officials are responding to local
demands and the speed at which they embark on the resolution of disputes and to the
redressing of complaints. The former indicators are of outcomes while the latter indicators




· agricultural extension and livestock services
· roads and water
· security
As we noted above, local councils operate under a serious financial constraint, which
restricts their capacity for intervention. Moreover, the councils located in the south of the
country, and with a broader tax base, are in a much better position to raise revenue and thus
operate more effectively than their counterparts in the north. Still, a recent evaluation
(Goetz and Jenkins, 1998) notes a considerable amount of innovation in the primary health
sector in Uganda. The charges (costsharing) at the clinics are set by the local authorities
and the level of service provision has improved markedly in recent years. Many local
councils have introduced local tender boards, which encourage competition between
suppliers of materials, medicines and equipment. Although, many clinics have been able to
keep charges at affordable levels, instances of corruption as well as the need to bribe health
workers have persisted. Recently, during the presidential election campaigns, Yoweri
Museveni, declared the ‘costsharing’ of healthcare fees, that is the payment of fees at
public clinics, abolished.9 It is difficult to say whether this new policy is fully funded,
however. In any case the abolition reflects the fragility of local institutions as well as their
power, since such a decision should have been discussed first within the local levels
themselves.
With respect to education, especially primary education, the main thrust there has been the
central government’s introduction of Universal Primary Education. This has been a major
reform, probably the defining achievement of the NRM government. However, local
authorities have had to do a great deal to make a success of it. There is still a serious
shortage of school buildings, while teachers have also been scarce. Local councils that
have mobilized populations in the construction of school buildings and that have plans for
9 This was the second tax ‘abolished’ during the run-up to the elections of 2001. Even here, the timing
suggests that the move was more politically strategic than economic. In the aftermath of the ban, medicines
began to ‘disappear’ from hospitals and clinics once again.16
increasing teacher numbers, via better salaries, have been able to provide their school-
going populations much improved service, as is reflected in performance in the centrally
administered primary school examinations. Unfortunately, the disparity in performance
between districts that are near the capital and those at a remove remains quite large and
will probably be difficult to bridge in the medium term.
At the local level the supply of agricultural extension services and those related to transport
and water infrastructure are sparse. This is related directly to the lack of capacities
mentioned above. Again the richer districts are ahead of the others, but overall progress
here is not as marked as in the case of healthcare provision and education.
Peace is an important ingredient in the Ugandan context, and its probably here where local
councils have had their biggest contribution. In many areas of the country, decades of
lawlessness had led to declining respect for property rights, with legal cases taking years to
bring to court, and much longer to reach closure, if at all. Local councils have been able to
return the rule of law to many areas, and thereby a sense of security which has enabled
households to re-engage in income generating activities in many districts. In this regard,
the political wrangles in the districts also are reflections of the fact that given peace,
politicians find it worthwhile to compete in the market for political ideas. Lack of dissent
and acrimony during a period of rapid social and economic change would have been quite
odd.
Finally, on the general issue of governance, there has been a necessary period of learning-
by-doing and performance has varied greatly between regions. It is only recently that
firmer mechanisms have been put in place to ensure accountability at the local level. A
number of officers at the local level have lost their jobs as a result of poor accountability
and corruption. Citizens at the local level are also becoming more assertive in their
demands for services and higher accountability, in some cases even threatening not to pay
taxes. This has been recognized by the government, which now announces all its
disbursements to the local governments in the newspapers in order to ensure local
monitoring of expenditure and to ensure that services are actually delivered (Ablo and
Reinikka, 1997).
7. Conclusion
In many African countries, the creation of effective local institutions for decentralization
has only just begun. It will, thus, take a while before the information systems, local level
tender boards, drug procurement procedures, auditing systems, sanctions for poor
performance, as well as the establishment of accountability to the centre are in place. There
is, however, genuine concern that in the midst of decentralization the centre continues to
claim the bulk of resources, those generated internally as well as donor and other foreign
inflows. Urban concentration of resources leads to a boom in economic activity in areas
already relatively well-off, while shortage of resource causes lethargy and dependence on
the centre in the countryside.
It is worth stressing, however, that decentralization is a process whose success hinges on a
whole range of factors: political, social and economic. In Uganda the tenets of the process
are now in place, including well-defined political structures, and how they will relate and
be accountable to the communities and the central government. For perhaps the first time17
since independence in the 1960s local communities can now influence directly the policies
that affect their daily lives. Successful decentralization takes time and is also resource
demanding. What is important, however, is to ensure progress in building local institutions.
It is the strength of these that will guarantee the success of decentralization.
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